内容来源：https://www.theverge.com/report/892661/iran-war-oil-gas-prices-data-center-electricity

内容总结：

美伊冲突升级推高全球能源价格 数据中心建设面临社会压力考验

随着美国与以色列对伊朗实施打击并导致其最高领袖身亡，近期持续升级的美伊冲突已对全球能源市场产生实质性冲击。霍尔木兹海峡——这条承担全球约五分之一石油及液化天然气贸易的战略水道——正成为冲突的关键杠杆点。伊朗革命卫队已威胁切断对"敌对一方及其合作伙伴"的石油出口，并据报道开始在海峡布设水雷。

大西洋理事会全球能源中心研究主任里德·布莱克莫尔指出，市场反应已从初期的航运保险成本上升，转变为对海峡通行安全的根本性担忧。目前海峡通行量几近归零，多国已开始削减产量。国际油价在亚洲市场开盘时一度飙升至每桶近120美元，反映出市场对冲突长期化的预期。

尽管美国凭借其能源主导地位在一定程度上缓冲了国内消费者最初受到的冲击，但布莱克莫尔强调，美国仍通过石油出口深度参与全球市场，无法完全隔绝国际油价波动的影响。随着冲突持续，美国汽油价格将面临上行压力。

在电力市场方面，美国因天然气主要依赖国内区域贸易，短期受影响程度低于欧洲和东亚。但作为主要液化天然气出口国，国际气价上涨将激励更多天然气出口，最终仍会推高国内气价，进而传导至电力成本。

这对蓬勃发展的AI数据中心建设构成潜在挑战。布莱克莫尔分析指出，虽然电力成本在数据中心运营总成本中占比有限，且短期内美国电价不会因冲突出现危机性上涨，但若冲突持续数月导致全球天然气市场持续紧缩，气价上涨最终将推高电价。这不会直接阻碍数据中心建设，却可能加剧民众对数据中心的不满情绪——因为大规模数据中心用电需求正在使居民电费账单不断攀升，进一步削弱数据中心建设的社会接受度。

当前局势表明，地缘政治冲突正通过能源渠道产生连锁反应，科技基础设施的扩张与社会承受力之间的平衡将面临新的考验。

中文翻译：

特朗普政府发动对伊朗的战争后不久，我致电大西洋理事会全球能源中心的研究与项目主任里德·布莱克莫尔，探讨这场冲突可能带来的后果。当时油气价格虽已上涨，但人们仍更多期待冲突的影响或许只是短暂的。通话结束时，布莱克莫尔直言不讳地说："我们下周再通一次话……届时我们对冲突的走向以及能源领域未来的真实情况会有清晰得多的认识。"

不断升级的伊朗冲突如何影响数据中心与电力成本

能源价格可能进一步飙升，加剧对数据中心的担忧。

能源基础设施已成为这场持续战争的关键博弈点。

一周过去，自美国和以色列对伊朗发动袭击导致最高领袖阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊身亡以来，冲突持续升级。能源基础设施已成为这场持续战争的关键博弈点——以色列袭击了伊朗的燃料库，伊朗则在反击中瞄准了海湾邻国的油气基础设施。伊朗准军事革命卫队周二威胁称，"在另行通知前，不会允许敌对一方及其合作伙伴从该地区出口哪怕一升石油"。据报道，伊朗已开始在战略要地霍尔木兹海峡布设水雷，全球五分之一的石油消费量和液化天然气贸易曾依赖这条航道通行。

今天我再次与布莱克莫尔交谈，探讨伊朗持续扼守霍尔木兹海峡对能源成本意味着什么，以及美国科技公司争相建设高耗能人工智能数据中心将面临何种影响。

本次访谈经过编辑，以精简内容并提升清晰度。

问：您如何看待当前冲突对石油和汽油价格的影响？

里德·布莱克莫尔： 就冲突对能源的影响而言，当前的核心问题在于市场如何应对霍尔木兹海峡安全通行的不确定性。冲突初期我们看到船舶保险费上涨时，讨论焦点主要是"穿越海湾的航运成本大幅增加，因此船只选择避开该区域"。而现在问题已演变为对海峡通行安全性的切实担忧，这不再仅仅是保险成本问题，更是安全保障问题。

目前霍尔木兹海峡几乎没有船只通行。许多国家开始关闭生产设施。纯粹因为市场和油轮从根本上担忧能否安全通过海峡，连锁效应已经显现。

"美国能源主导地位对消费者的保护作用有限"

我认为过去几天市场反应强烈的另一个因素，是对冲突持续时间的预判。过去72小时内总统的表态及市场反应就是重要证据。随着冲突在周末明显升级，霍尔木兹海峡开放与否的不确定性开始达到沸点。周日亚洲市场开盘后油价突破每桶100美元逼近120美元，这实际反映了市场认为冲突不会很快结束。而昨日出现的价格回落，则是对总统表态"我们看到冲突即将结束"的直接反应。

美国作为主要产油国，其能源主导战略在保护消费者免受对伊开战引发的初始市场冲击方面发挥了重要作用。迄今为止我们看到的油价涨幅本应对市场波动更为敏感。这为政府争取了一些时间，延缓了国内汽油价格开始真正飙升的时间点。但随着冲突持续和市场波动延续，遗憾的是，我们将逐渐看到汽油价格面临上涨压力。

在石油这种全球贸易的大宗商品市场上，美国能源主导地位对消费者的保护作用终究有限。虽然作为主要国内产油国，美国有能力对本国汽油价格施加下行压力，但通过石油出口参与全球市场，就必然暴露于全球石油市场的波动之中。

问：电价是否也会上涨？原因何在？

对美国而言，天然气的情况稍好，但同样无法完全隔绝于全球市场。天然气主要在美国境内区域交易，美国作为满足国内消费的主要生产国，具备更强的抵御能力。这使得美国的情况与欧洲、日本或其他东亚地区面临的天然气价格敏感性截然不同。

但问题与石油类似——美国是主要的液化天然气出口国。当其他地区天然气价格上涨时，液化天然气出口商将受套利机会驱动增加出口，从而在国内形成价格上涨压力。

问：这对科技公司及建设更多人工智能数据中心和相关能源基础设施的浪潮构成哪些风险？

在美国，大部分新建数据中心已开始使用天然气供电。短期内我们不会看到这场冲突导致美国电价达到危机水平。天然气及由此产生的电价影响时间跨度可能是数月而非石油那样的数周。

然而，冲突持续越久，全球天然气市场越紧张——这种压力终将传导至美国，推高天然气价格，进而影响电价，最终波及数据中心问题。

我认为特殊之处在于，这未必直接影响数据中心购买能源的能力。电力成本在数据中心建设和运营总成本中占比相对较小。真正的影响在于，这将进一步加剧当前因能源可负担性挑战而导致的数据中心社会认可度下降问题。因此电价上涨可能不会直接阻碍数据中心建设，但其引发的附带可负担性挑战将加深公众对数据中心建设的不满——因为数据中心建设正导致居民电费账单大幅上涨。

英文来源：

Soon after the Trump administration launched its war on Iran, I called up Reed Blakemore, director of research and programs at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, to talk about the consequences. While oil and gas prices were already on the rise, there was still more hope then that the impact of the conflict might be short-lived. At the end of our conversation, Blakemore said plainly: “Let’s have a call again [next week] … We’ll have a much clearer picture of what the conflict is going to look like and what the story really is going to be for energy moving forward.”
How the spiraling Iran conflict could affect data centers and electricity costs
Energy prices could rise much higher than they already have, inflaming concerns around data centers.
Energy prices could rise much higher than they already have, inflaming concerns around data centers.
Energy infrastructure has become a key leverage point in the unfolding war
It’s a week later and the conflict has only escalated since the US and Israel launched strikes against Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Energy infrastructure has become a key leverage point in the unfolding war, with Israel hitting Iranian fuel depots and Iran targeting Gulf neighbors’ oil and gas infrastructure in its own strikes. Iran’s paramilitary Revolutionary Guard threatened on Tuesday not to “not allow the export of even a single liter of oil from the region to the hostile side and its partners until further notice.” Iran has reportedly also started to lay mines in the strategic Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth of global petroleum consumption and liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade used to move.
I talked to Blakemore again today about what Iran’s continued chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz means for energy costs and US tech companies’ rush to build out energy-hungry AI data centers.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
What’s your outlook now on how the conflict is likely to affect oil and gasoline prices?
Reed Blakemore: The fundamental issue right now, in terms of the energy implications of the conflict, is how the market is reacting to the uncertainty around safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz.
At the outset of the conflict when we saw insurance premiums going up for these ships, we were largely talking about it in the context of, Hey, it’s just gotten much more expensive for a ship to traverse the Gulf and therefore they’re staying out.
We’ve moved from that to actual concerns around the security of passing through the straits in the first place, so this is no longer an insurance cost issue as much as it is a safety and security issue.
We have virtually no traffic passing through the Strait of Hormuz. A lot of countries are beginning to shut in production. So there’s already this ripple effect emerging purely because the market and basically tankers are fundamentally concerned about whether or not they will be able to safely pass through the strait.
“There’s only so much that US energy dominance can do to shield US consumers”
The other feature that I think we’ve seen the market react strongly to in the past several days is a sense of how long this conflict is going to last. And I think you can look to the comments from the president in the last 72 hours and the market’s reaction as a major piece of evidence to that end. Moving into the weekend where the campaign had clearly escalated, the uncertainty around how open the Strait of Hormuz would or wouldn’t be was beginning to reach a fever pitch. The response from markets when they opened in Asia on Sunday going past $100 a barrel to nearly $120 a barrel is really a function of the market not having a sense that this would be over anytime soon. That pullback that we saw over the course of yesterday was in response to the president saying fundamentally that Hey, we have an end in sight to this conflict.
The United States is a major oil producer. I think the strategy of US energy dominance played a significant role in terms of shielding US consumers from the initial market consequences of the decision to go to war with Iran. The price increases we’ve seen thus far would have been much more responsive to the market volatility. That has bought the administration a little bit of time as it relates to how long until we see the gasoline prices really begin to pick up steam domestically. But as this conflict persists and the volatility in the market continues, we will begin to see upward pressure on gasoline prices, regrettably, over time.
There’s only so much that US energy dominance can do to shield US consumers from what is a globally traded market in terms of oil. Because the United States is a major domestic oil producer, it has the ability to put some downward pressure on its own gasoline prices.
But because via its oil exports it participates in a global market, it has that exposure to global oil market volatility.
Can we expect electricity prices to go up also? Why?
For the United States, the gas story is a little bit better, but not immune from the global market as well. Natural gas is largely regionally traded within the United States. The US is a major producer of natural gas for domestic consumption in a way that further insulates it. That makes the case of the United States much different than the gas price sensitivity we’re seeing in Europe or in Japan or other parts of East Asia.
The problem is similar to the oil story because the United States is a major LNG exporter. As natural gas prices increase elsewhere, LNG exporters will be incentivized to export more gas because that’s where the arbitrage opportunity is, and that will create the upward price pressure domestically in the United States.
What risks does that pose to tech companies and this push to build out more AI data centers and related energy infrastructure?
In the United States, the majority of the data center buildout has begun to be powered by natural gas. We’re not going to see electricity prices reach a crisis point in the United States in the short term because of this conflict. The time horizon that we’re talking about with gas and therefore electricity prices is likely in the time horizon of months rather than weeks you’d expect with oil.
However, the longer this conflict lasts and the more tightness we see in the global gas market — that will eventually permeate the United States and create that upward pressure on gas prices in a way which then affects electricity prices and then that brings the data center question into play.
I think the unique thing is it doesn’t necessarily affect the ability of data centers to purchase energy. Electricity costs are a relatively marginal proportion of the cost of building and operating a data center. What it does do is it only further inflames the energy affordability challenges that are currently deteriorating social license in the country for data centers. So the impact on electricity prices likely won’t directly harm data center buildout. The ancillary affordability challenges it will create will further entrench popular discontent with data center buildout, because data centers are simply making consumer electricity bills much more expensive.